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 Constitutionally Unaccountable: Privatized Immigration 
Detention 
DANIELLE C. JEFFERIS* 
For-profit, civil immigration detention is one of this nation’s fastest growing 
industries. About two-thirds of the more than 50,000 people in the civil custody of 
federal immigration authorities find themselves at one point or another in a private, 
corporate-run prison that contracts with the federal government. Conditions of 
confinement in many of these facilities are dismal. Detainees have suffered from 
untreated medical conditions and endured months, in some cases years, of detention 
in environments that are unsafe and, at times, violent. Some have died. Yet, the spaces 
are largely unregulated.  
 This Article exposes and examines the absence of a constitutional tort remedy for 
the people behind the walls of for-profit immigration prisons. Two Supreme Court 
decisions are relevant: Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko and Minneci 
v. Pollard. These cases focus on the availability of constitutional tort remedies 
against private prison operators and their employees for people incarcerated 
pursuant to the government’s criminal law authority, not civil immigration-
enforcement authority. Yet, on the federal level, the growth of for-profit civil 
detention is far outpacing that of for-profit criminal incarceration. And the 
conditions in today’s immigration detention facilities—and the experience of the 
people in custody—are inherently carceral; there is no meaningful difference 
between criminal incarceration and civil immigration confinement. This Article 
asserts that the same values that underpin constitutional jurisprudence regulating 
criminal incarceration—namely, the constitutional principle of dignity and the 
inherently governmental function of incarceration, as well as values of transparency 
and accountability—must allow for a constitutional tort remedy for people whose 
rights are violated in for-profit immigration prisons. Otherwise, for many thousands 
of people—the majority of whom are people of color—the Constitution and federal 
courts are out of reach, leaving some of the most egregious rights violations inflicted 
on the federal government’s watch unremedied. 
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When the history of the United States in the last quarter of the twentieth century is 
written, it may be recalled as the period of the “second great confinement.” 
- Jonathan Simon1 
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INTRODUCTION 
Roberto2 was shot on the streets in June 2016. He sustained multiple gunshot 
wounds, causing life-threatening internal injuries. At the hospital, doctors performed 
emergency surgery to repair his organs. They inserted a stent in Roberto’s abdomen 
to address the internal bleeding. Although Roberto had numerous bullet fragments in 
his body, removing those objects was a secondary concern to stopping the bleeding 
and keeping him alive. Surgeons advised Roberto he must undergo a series of 
surgeries over the next several months to remove the remaining fragments and to 
monitor the stent.  
Three months later, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials 
arrested Roberto, charged him with civil immigration law violations, initiated 
removal proceedings against him, and detained him in a private detention center 
contracting with ICE. When he arrived at the facility, Roberto informed the staff of 
his injuries and need for further treatment. He showed them the pieces of bullet 
protruding from just under his skin over his rib cage. He requested medical assistance 
repeatedly for his severe back and abdominal pain and his ensuing abnormal weight 
loss. The only medical treatment the detention center staff provided Roberto was 
ibuprofen, Pepto-Bismol, and a second mattress for his bed. The bullet-fragment sites 
turned black and blue and oozed pus. Roberto did not see a doctor or receive further 
treatment for more than a year. If Roberto had been confined in a state prison or a 
federal government-run prison, the law would have allowed him to sue the officials 
responsible for the apparent violation of his constitutional right to adequate medical 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Jonathan Simon, Refugees in a Carceral Age: The Rebirth of Immigration Prisons in 
the United States, 10 PUB. CULTURE 577, 577 (1998). 
 2. This name has been changed to protect the person’s identity. 
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care and, if successful, recover some compensation for the harm he suffered due to 
their failure to treat his condition. But Roberto was in a private immigration prison—
run by a corporation contracting with the federal government—which meant he had 
no way to vindicate this apparent past violation of his constitutional right.  
A substantial body of law has developed regarding the constitutional limits of 
incarceration in this country and, specifically, the contours of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.3 People convicted of a 
crime and confined in state prisons, as well as in government-run prisons on the 
federal level, to wait out their sentence are protected by the constitutional right to 
adequate medical care, a safe prison environment, and humane conditions. They may 
vindicate past violations of those rights through lawsuits alleging constitutional torts. 
The Constitution affords no tort remedy, however, for people like Roberto who suffer 
from untreated serious medical conditions, risks to their safety, and violence while 
incarcerated in for-profit, federal immigration prisons. Conditions of confinement in 
many of these facilities are dismal4 but the spaces are largely unregulated. As this 
Article shows, they are constitutionally unaccountable.  
This Article has three parts. Part I describes the landscape of the modern federal, 
civil immigration detention system, including its origins, the government’s authority 
to confine people, and the rise of the private detention regime. Part II compares and 
contrasts the constitutional tort remedies available to people incarcerated in state 
prisons and federal government-run prisons with those available to people confined 
in for-profit immigration prisons. Part III asserts the remedies available to people in 
private immigration prisons should at minimum be parallel to those available to 
people confined in federal government-run prisons. This argument is based on three 
primary considerations: the constitutional value of dignity, the constitutional 
function of incarceration, and the constitutional goals of government transparency 
and accountability. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confinement 
Is Cruel and Far Too Usual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741 (2015); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, 
Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881 (2009); Brittany 
Glidden, Necessary Suffering?: Weighing Government and Prisoner Interests in Determining 
What Is Cruel and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1815 (2012).  
 4. See, e.g., Fernanda Echavarri, Dozens of ICE Detainees Were Pepper-Sprayed by 
Guards for Protesting at a Louisiana Jail, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 2, 2019), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/08/immigrant-detention-ice-bossier-louisiana 
-pepper-spray/ [https://perma.cc/6MPK-QZ82]; Susan Greene, GEO-Run Aurora ICE 
Detention Center Is Isolating Immigrants—Some Mentally Ill—in Prolonged Solitary 
Confinement, COLO. INDEP. (Aug. 6, 2019), 
https://www.coloradoindependent.com/2019/08/06/ice-geo-detainees-solitary-confinement/ 
[https://perma.cc/F5VW-T7XX]; Hannah Rappleye & Lisa Riordan Seville, 24 Immigrants 
Have Died in ICE Custody During the Trump Administration, NBC NEWS (June 9, 2019, 11:00 
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/24-immigrants-have-died-ice-custody 
-during-trump-administration-n1015291 [https://perma.cc/9RNN-YBU2]; Devon M. Sayers 
& Catherine E. Shoichet, ICE Detainee Dies in Georgia While Waiting to Be Deported, CNN 
(July 25, 2019, 1:41 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/25/us/georgia-ice-detainee 
-dies/index.html [https://perma.cc/3S88-P88E]; Alice Speri, Detained, Then Violated, 
INTERCEPT (Apr. 11, 2018, 12:11 PM), https://theintercept.com/2018/04/11/immigration 
-detention-sexual-abuse-ice-dhs/ [https://perma.cc/UZC3-YMCQ]. 
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But first, two notes about terminology: One, migration-related confinement is 
difficult to define consistently, in part because the system is vast and the authority to 
incarcerate spans many agencies and jurisdictions. Some scholars rely on an 
expansive definition of immigration detention that includes people who have been 
charged or convicted criminally with an offense or offenses stemming from their 
migration activity and are in the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service, the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, and state authorities.5 This Article focuses on one type of 
migration-related confinement—the confinement imposed by the federal agencies 
tasked with enforcing civil immigration laws, including ICE and U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection—but even that definition is imprecise in characterizing the 
confinement as “civil.”6 Nevertheless, for purposes of this Article, I focus on so-
called “civil” immigration detention to highlight the disparities between people 
confined for putatively civil reasons and those incarcerated pursuant to criminal law 
and leave the deconstruction of the term “civil detention” itself for future work. 
Two, I deliberately use “detention” and “prison” interchangeably throughout the 
Article. The conditions in immigration detention, and the experiences of those 
confined in them, make the use of “prison” appropriate. When I separate the two 
terms, it is largely to differentiate between the legal powers under which people are 
confined: immigration detention being pursuant to so-called civil legal powers and 
prison being pursuant to criminal legal powers.  
I. CIVIL IMMIGRATION CONFINEMENT: HISTORY, AUTHORITY, PROFITEERING 
To fairly assess the significance of a constitutional tort remedy for those confined 
in private immigration prisons, it is helpful to first understand the history of, authority 
for, and today’s sheer scope of civil immigration confinement in the United States, 
as well as for-profit corporations’ roles in overseeing and managing that system. 
Much like the American criminal law system incarcerates the most people in the 
world,7 the United States is also the titleholder for the world’s largest civil 
immigration detention system. The number of people confined in the custody of civil 
immigration enforcement agencies each year is approximately double the number of 
people in federal criminal custody.8 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. See, e.g., César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Abolishing Immigration Prisons, 97 
B.U. L. REV. 245, 248 n.8 (2017) (defining “immigration prisons” as “secure facilities in which 
migrants are confined due to a suspected or confirmed violation of immigration law,” 
including spaces confining people under both civil and criminal law powers); id. at 252–53 
(discussing the “blurry boundary between civil detention and criminal confinement for 
migration-related activity” and asserting “[w]hether acting under the authority of civil or 
criminal law, law enforcement officials at every level of government regularly take into 
custody people who are thought to have violated immigration laws”). 
 6. See René Lima-Marín & Danielle C. Jefferis, It’s Just Like Prison: Is a Civil 
(Nonpunitive) System of Immigration Detention Theoretically Possible?, 96 DENV. L. REV. 
955 (2019); Danielle C. Jefferis, The Civil Detention Fallacy (2019) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the Indiana Law Journal).  
 7. E.g., Evangeline Dech, Nonprofit Organizations: Humanizing Immigration 
Detention, 53 CAL. W. L. REV. 219, 221 (2017). 
 8. Id. at 220 (“The Department of Homeland Security (‘DHS’) detains around 400,000 
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The civil immigration detention apparatus is the fastest growing component of the 
American system of mass incarceration.9 Even by its own measure, the federal 
government incarcerates an unprecedented and growing number of people each year 
pursuant to its civil immigration enforcement authority. In 2017, estimates of the 
average daily population of people confined for immigration-related offenses ranged 
from more than 38,00010 to as much as 40,500.11 By the end of 2018, the daily 
detention population exceeded 48,000.12 In early 2019, the number of people 
confined by ICE alone reached nearly 50,000,13 and by the middle of 2019, the figure 
exceeded 52,000—an apparent all-time high.14 Annually, the government 
incarcerates nearly 400,000 people under the same authority,15 a figure that has also 
grown substantially over the last few years, and one the government is likely to 
surpass in 2019. 
To expand this system of incarceration, the government relies heavily on private, 
for-profit corporations to operate civil immigration prisons.16 With no means to 
                                                                                                                 
 
people each year, giving the United States one of the largest immigration detainee populations 
in the world.”); Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration Detention, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2141, 2142 (2017) (“Immigration detention has become one of the most egregious forms of 
mass incarceration in the United States. Over 440,000 immigrants are detained in this country 
each year, far more than anywhere else in the world.”); see also Dora Schriro, Women and 
Children First: An Inside Look at the Challenges to Reforming Family Detention in the United 
States, in CHALLENGING IMMIGRATION DETENTION: ACADEMICS, ACTIVISTS AND POLICY-
MAKERS 28, 30–32 (Michael J. Flynn & Matthew B. Flynn eds., 2017); MARY SMALL, DET. 
WATCH NETWORK, A TOXIC RELATIONSHIP: PRIVATE PRISONS AND U.S. IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION 2 (2016).  
 9. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1348 (2014); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 
Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 42, 44–45 (2010) (“The growth in immigration detention in recent 
years has been remarkable. In 1994, officials held approximately 6,000 noncitizens in 
detention on any given day. That daily average had surpassed 20,000 individuals by 2001 and 
33,000 by 2008. Over the same period, the overall number of individuals detained each year 
has swelled from approximately 81,000 to approximately 380,000.”). 
 10. EMILY RYO & IAN PEACOCK, THE LANDSCAPE OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 6 (2018). 
 11. DET. WATCH NETWORK & NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., ICE LIES: PUBLIC 
DECEPTION, PRIVATE PROFIT 2 (2018). 
 12. Erica Werne, Damian Paletta & Seung Min Kim, Shutdown Looms as Border Talks 
Break Down over Immigration Enforcement, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2019, 5:51 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/border-talks-at-impasse-as-shutdown 
-looms-friday-officials-say/2019/02/10/aa8ef08c-2d36-11e9-813a-0ab2f17e305b_story.html 
?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/AS6E-CK5M]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Hamed Aleaziz, More Than 52,000 People Are Now Being Detained By ICE, an 
Apparent All-Time High, BUZZFEED (May 20, 2019, 6:58 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/ice-detention-record-immigrants 
-border [https://perma.cc/E9RS-36R3]. 
 15. Dech, supra note 7, at 220. 
 16. See RYO & PEACOCK, supra note 10, at 14. 
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enforce detention standards17 and few mechanisms to hold them accountable for 
violating those standards, for-profit immigration prisons are the subjects of the 
highest number of grievances the federal government receives from the people 
confined in its custody.18  
A. Confinement History 
So-called civil detention19—that is, nonpunitive incarceration—in the United 
States is nearly as old as the country’s founding.20 From the enslavement of millions 
of people from Africa to the forced displacement of indigenous people to the 
internment of Asian Americans and others during the first half of the twentieth 
century, the federal government has a long history of confining people pursuant to 
powers outside of the criminal process.21 
But in the immigration sphere, the federal government did not always default to 
detention.22 Indeed, the federal government stayed out of immigration regulation 
almost entirely for much of the country’s first century, leaving the matter to the 
states.23 In the middle of the nineteenth century, however, federal government 
officials began requiring transatlantic companies to detain migrants on arriving ships 
while assessing whether to allow the noncitizens to “enter” the United States.24 This 
arrangement soon turned into detention at onshore sites operated by the shipping 
companies25—where conditions were nightmarish26—and then at government-run 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. See Steven Neeley, Comment, Immigration Detention: The Inaction of the Bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 729, 738 (2008). 
 18. See RYO & PEACOCK, supra note 10, at 28. 
 19. I say “so-called” here because I question the premise that nonpunitive detention is 
possible. See generally Jefferis, supra note 6; Lima-Marín & Jefferis, supra note 6, at 11 
 20. Juliet P. Stumpf, Civil Detention and Other Oxymorons, 40 QUEEN’S L.J. 55, 62 
(2014). 
 21. Schriro, supra note 8, at 29; see generally Stephanie J. Silverman, Immigration 
Detention in America: A History of Its Expansion and a Study of Its Significance (Ctr. on 
Migration, Policy, & Soc’y, Univ. of Oxford, Working Paper No. 80, 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1867366 [https://perma.cc/EER4-LYD9]. 
 22. Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45 
HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 601, 610 (2010); Ana Raquel Minian, America Didn’t 
Always Lock Up Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/01/opinion/sunday/border-detention-tear-gas 
-migrants.html [https://perma.cc/MZX4-FXB]; see also CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA 
HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW 240 (2015); Dech, supra note 7, at 223–24.  
 23. CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON 21 (2019). 
 24. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 23, at 24. 
 25. See, e.g., GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 23, at 24–25 (describing how the federal 
government created the legal “entry fiction” to permit shipping companies to allow passengers 
to disembark but remain confined in onshore private detention sites while the government 
processed their admission to—or exclusion from—the United States). 
 26. Id. at 25–26 (“Soon conditions inside early immigration prisons were atrocious. ‘The 
air is impure, the place is crowded,’ wrote one visitor to a San Francisco ‘Chinese jail,’ as the 
dockside facilities were often described. ‘I have visited quite a few jails and State prisons in 
this country, but have never seen any place half so bad,’ he added.”). 
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Ellis and Angel Islands by the late nineteenth century.27 Immigration confinement on 
the mass scale did not emerge, however, until the 1980s.28 Three primary 
developments over the course of the 1980s and 1990s spurred this emergence of the 
modern system of immigration incarceration: the arrival of thousands of Cuban and 
Haitian refugees and exiles during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift and migration 
movements that soon followed,29 the evolution of the government’s “detention as 
deterrence” platform,30 and growth of “crimmigration” law and its attendant 
mandatory detention provisions.31 
Through the early and middle twentieth century, the detention of people for 
migration-related reasons in the United States declined in comparison to the era of 
Ellis and Angel Islands.32 Immigration rates fell over those decades, due in part to 
the Great Depression and harsh U.S. immigration policies.33 By the middle of the 
twentieth century, detention was reserved for unusual circumstances—usually 
“migrants who were deemed likely to abscond or who posed a threat to national 
security or public safety.”34 Indeed, by January 1955, fewer than five people in 
immigration custody were seeking entry into the country.35 What had once been the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. E.g., GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 240; Dech, supra note 7, at 223 (“The 
Ellis Island facility in New York Harbor was the first federally operated immigration detention 
center in the United States.”); Simon, supra note 1, at 579; Stumpf, supra note 20, at 64. 
 28. Minian, supra note 22; Simon, supra note 1, at 579. 
 29. Minian, supra note 22; Simon, supra note 1, at 579. 
 30. Minian, supra note 22; Simon, supra note 1, at 583 (“The new imprisonment policy 
was aimed at substituting the deterrent of the prison for the removal discretion lost to the 
Refugee Act.”). 
 31. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 240–42 (“By way of comparison, the INS had 
the capacity to detain approximately 1,700 migrants on average per day in 1982 and about 
7,000 in 1990. By the end of the century, the agency held just shy of 20,000 each day. Ten 
years later . . . the average daily population had again grown by 10,000. . . . Much of this 
growth can be attributed to the increasingly punitive views of immigration law violators that 
started in the 1980s and have yet to abate. In the last three decades . . . Congress and multiple 
presidential administrations have intertwined criminal law and immigration law so that tactics 
traditionally associated with one are now prominent features of the other. In this case, criminal 
punishment’s long reliance on incarceration as a means of deterring—theoretically at least—
and punishing undesirable conduct has become an accepted part of immigration law 
enforcement.”). 
 32. Minian, supra note 22 (“The United States first imposed immigration detention in the 
late 19th century. But by the early 1950s, detaining migrants no longer seemed necessary.”). 
 33. Id. (“European and Asian migration had fallen drastically as a result of the 
Immigration Act of 1924 and the Great Depression.”). 
 34. Id.  
 35. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 8 (“Indeed, from the 1950s until the 1980s, the 
[Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)] had a policy of not using detention except in 
unusual circumstances.”); Simon, supra note 1, at 579 (“A few cases of immigration 
imprisonment made their way through the courts in the 1940s and 1950s, mainly involving 
aliens suspected of subversion on behalf of the Axis powers and later the Soviet Union. In 
1954 Ellis Island closed its doors as an active immigration center, and with it closed the last 
federal facility for imprisoning immigrants.”); Minian, supra note 22 (“Reflecting . . . this 
change, in 1958 the Supreme Court, in Leng May Ma v. Barber, held that ‘physical detention 
of aliens is now the exception, not the rule,’ pointing out that ‘certainly this policy reflects the 
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rule at the height of the use of Ellis and Angel Islands—confinement—became the 
exception.36 
This measured approach to immigration confinement came to an end with the 
Mariel Boatlift in the early 1980s and the arrival of thousands of Cuban and Haitian 
migrants and refugees to the shores of the United States.37 As for the former, more 
than 120,000 Cubans fled Cuba for the United States en masse “in a highly politicized 
migration that garnered national and international media attention and inspired fear 
among many Americans”38 that was “the single largest Cuban exodus in history.”39 
That public fear of the arriving Cubans was likely sparked by inaccurate accounts 
that many or most of the arrivals were criminals, political prisoners, and “anti-
socials.”40  
This manufactured and propagandized fear of the Cuban migrants and refugees41 
intersected with the federal government’s perception that the immigration system 
                                                                                                                 
 
humane qualities of an enlightened civilization.’”) (footnote omitted). 
 36. García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1372 (“Detention has long been part of the 
immigration law enforcement arsenal, but before the 1980s it was never a central feature of 
immigration policing. Instead, it was always the exception. Indeed, from 1954 until the early 
1980s the INS tended to release individuals suspected of violating immigration laws.”).  
 37. Id. at 1360 (“The 1980s proved to be a crucial period in enacting the legislation that 
laid the groundwork for today’s massive immigration incarceration. This was the period when 
Haitians boarded rickety rafts in large numbers hoping to make their way to the United States, 
and Cubans left the port of Mariel looking to join South Florida’s prospering émigré 
community.”); Simon, supra note 1, at 579 (“Immigration imprisonment was reinvented in 
1981 in response to the massive immigration flow to south Florida in the spring of 1980 that 
became known as the Mariel boatlift.”); Minian, supra note 22. 
 38. Minian, supra note 22; see also MARK S. HAMM, THE ABANDONED ONES: THE 
IMPRISONMENT AND UPRISING OF THE MARIEL BOAT PEOPLE 51–52 (1995). 
 39. HAMM, supra note 38, at 50 (citations omitted).  
 40. Id. 50–51 (“While it is cavalier to make generalizations, accounts indicate that some 
of the refugees were ‘anti-socials,’ former political prisoners, and petty criminals. However, 
the same accounts of the Freedom Flotilla reveal that the vast majority of Cubans passing 
through Mariel were upstanding family members who were students, government employees, 
professionals, or laborers. They were farmers, mechanics, fishermen, truck drivers, 
seamstresses, accountants, construction workers, plumbers, carpenters, and professional 
baseball players. It is estimated that 75 percent of the refugees were of working age and, of 
those, 57 percent were men.”) (citations omitted); Simon, supra note 1, at 590–91 (“The racial 
stereotypes triggered by their physical appearance were even further distorted by early and 
erroneous press reports that the Mariel Cubans included a large number of physically and 
mentally disabled persons and criminals. The Mariel immigrants were viciously and largely 
inaccurately stamped from the start with the stigma of dangerousness. The public perception 
was of an overwhelmingly unskilled mass likely to be dependent, if not predatory, on 
American society. In fact, the Marielitos were a highly diverse lot in terms of economic 
potential.”) (citations omitted).  
 41. Simon, supra note 1, at 582–83 (“The Mariel Cuban refugees, after all, fit the same 
ideological position in the then-reactivated cold war of the 1980s (as did Nicaraguans a few 
years later), yet they were also quickly stigmatized as criminals and deviants. In addition to 
the weakening of the cold war logic, refugees in the 1980s were increasingly seen in a new 
framework of threat. The new nexus was not the superpower rivalry, but the mass of poor 
(both domestic and foreign) perceived as a new dangerous class whose unconstrained needs 
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was incapable of processing large numbers of people en masse. Although the newly 
enacted Refugee Act of 1980, which marked the nation’s adoption of the 
international definition of “refugee,”42 provided for provisional admission of the 
people arriving to the United States, the refugees had to be processed and screened 
extensively by officials before the government permitted them to reside lawfully 
within the United States.43 The assessment and processing, which included an 
individualized medical examination with X-rays and lab tests, was in contrast to the 
government’s swift removal of migrants who could not satisfy admission 
requirements.44 To manage screening tens of thousands of new arrivals, the federal 
government resorted to incarceration.45 
The arrival of the Cubans coincided with increased migration from Haiti, with 
more than a thousand Haitians arriving in the United States each month during the 
same period.46 Soon the government’s “detention as the exception” reverted back to 
detention as the rule.47  
                                                                                                                 
 
and desires threatened to overwhelm the nation.”).  
 42. Simon, supra note 1, at 583 (“The new law for the first time adopted the prevailing 
international law definition of a refugee. The relevant legal question became whether the 
immigrant as an individual had a credible fear of persecution on the grounds of religion, race, 
or politics, not what race or nationality they belonged to.”); see also Cheryl Little, United 
States Haitian Policy: A History of Discrimination, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 269, 271 
(1993) (“The Refugee Act of 1980 was meant to bring United States law into conformity with 
international treaty obligations and to establish a permanent, systematic procedure for meeting 
the humanitarian needs of refugees and those seeking asylum in the United States.”). 
 43. HAMM, supra note 38, at 54 (“The Refugee Act required that each Cuban undergo a 
medical examination (complete with X-rays and lab tests) and interviews with agents of the 
INS, the FBI, the Pentagon, and the CIA. If it was determined that a[ noncitizen] posed no 
threat to the safety of the general public, then he or she was placed on ‘parole’ by the INS with 
the understanding that if there was no violation of the law, he or she would become eligible 
for permanent U.S. residence after seven years. But if convicted of a crime during that seven 
years, a[ noncitizen] would be deported.”) (citations omitted).  
 44. See Simon, supra note 1, at 583 (“The immediate effect of the [Refugee Act of 1980] 
was to make it possible for those refugees who could find legal advice to file claims that would 
at least delay their removal. In short, the INS was not able to quickly remove those 
inconvenient and threatening asylum seekers as it had through the late 1970s.”) (citation 
omitted).  
 45. Id.; Minian, supra note 22 (“During the 1980s, Americans came to see . . . hundreds 
of other Cuban exiles as such a dangerous threat that they once again turned to detention as an 
acceptable way to manage immigration. . . . News had spread swiftly that Mr. Castro’s 
government had sent criminals and mentally ill people among the arriving exiles. Although 
very few of the exiles had committed crimes, much less serious ones, fear of this wave of 
immigrants became widespread. This fear, fueled by rising crime rates in Miami and other 
communities where the Cuban exiles settled, led many Americans to demand the detention of 
the new arrivals. . . . Americans had come to fear these exiles so much that few of them 
protested their imprisonment and only a small number of legal workers tried to help them. The 
practice of detention was seen as necessary and normal.”). 
 46. Carlos Ortiz Miranda, Haiti and the United States During the 1980s and 1990s: 
Refugees, Immigration, and Foreign Policy, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 673, 681 (1995).  
 47. Little, supra note 42, at 277.  
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To implement this new detention-as-rule policy, the government needed spaces in 
which to confine the thousands of people seeking admission to the United States. The 
federal agencies began by opening up two large relocation camps in southern 
Florida.48 The camps were soon filled to capacity, so the government opened more 
camps and, soon, “service processing centers.”49 Thousands of Cuban and Haitian 
migrants and refugees languished for years in prisons across the country, some 
makeshift on military bases, others in Bureau of Prisons facilities—including the 
maximum-security prison in Atlanta—alongside people serving criminal sentences, 
with little to no mechanism to challenge their detention or to adjudicate their 
immigration status in the United States.50 
The arrivals of the Cuban and Haitian refugees also sparked the government’s 
“detention as deterrence” platform, the second primary contributor to the rise in 
immigration confinement.51 In his article Refugees in a Carceral Age, Professor 
Jonathan Simon describes how the federal government modeled its detention-as-
deterrence platform off the practice of “humane deterrence” in Thailand: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. HAMM, supra note 38, at 53; García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1360–61.  
 49. HAMM, supra note 38, at 53–54 (“Yet the massive influx of Cubans to the U.S.—
which approached nearly sixty thousand during the week of May 20 alone—demanded 
supplemental receiving and processing facilities beyond these two camps. Accordingly, the 
INS established additional relocation facilities at Elgin Air Force Base and Fort Walton Beach, 
Florida; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; and Fort Chaffee, 
Arkansas.”) (citations omitted); Simon, supra note 1, at 579 (“To address the potential for 
unauthorized immigration to south Florida, the [INS] opened the Krome Avenue Detention 
Center on a former Nike missile site twenty miles from downtown Miami, on the edges of the 
Florida Everglades. By the early 1990s the INS operated nine such ‘service processing centers’ 
with a combined capacity of about 2,500 persons.”) (citations omitted).  
 50. HAMM, supra note 38, at 52; García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1360–61 (“To deal 
with the approximately 125,000 Cuban ‘marielitos’ who came to the United States in 1979 
and 1980, the INS moved rapidly to set up immigration detention camps as well as to find 
space in the federal penitentiary in Atlanta to house the new arrivals.”) (footnote omitted); 
Minian, supra note 22 (“[T]he exiles waited to be sponsored by someone (or some institution) 
who agreed to take care of them until they could settle on their own. As the months went by, 
most exiles left the military bases, but those who had no family members or acquaintances in 
the United States often had difficulty finding sponsors. This placed them in an impossible 
situation. Without sponsorship, the only way they could leave the camps was by leaving the 
United States. But government officials could not deport them because the Castro government 
refused to take them back. These exiles, many of whom were labeled ‘antisocial’ but not 
accused of having committed any crime, were to remain in cages in the United States on an 
indefinite basis, with no prospects of being set free. . . . By 1982, about 400 Mariel Cubans 
who still had not been sponsored were sent to prison, primarily to the maximum-security 
penitentiary in Atlanta.”).  
 51. Simon, supra note 1, at 583 (“The new imprisonment policy was aimed at substituting 
the deterrent of the prison for the removal discretion lost to the Refugee Act.”); Minian, supra 
note 22 (“[The federal government] also conceived of detention as a way to deter migrants—
particularly Haitians, who had been fleeing their country since 1971—from setting sail to the 
United States. Up to that point, immigration officials still tended to follow the policy of 
releasing Haitians on parole pending a hearing and status determination, although they 
intermittently detained arriving Haitian migrants. By 1981, immigration officials were 
detaining all Haitians who arrived without offering them the possibility of parole.”). 
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Faced with large numbers of “boat people” fleeing the chaos of postwar 
Vietnam and Cambodia, and constrained by Western nations from 
forcibly repatriating refugees, the Thais established imprisonment 
camps. The challenge of this strategy was to make conditions 
uncomfortable enough to discourage refugees from some of the poorest 
and most oppressive countries in the world. Despite outcry from Western 
human rights groups, Western governments were distinctly reluctant to 
pressure the Thais to halt this approach.52  
In other words, to stop others from seeking admission to the United States—to send 
a message—the government would incarcerate large numbers of those who tried.53 
The third factor contributing to the rise of the country’s mass immigration 
incarceration system was the emergence and growth of “crimmigration” law. 
Crimmigration law refers to the intersection of “criminal law and procedure with 
immigration law and procedure.”54 Describing its emergence, Professor César 
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández writes: 
For most of the nation’s history, [criminal law and immigration law] 
operated almost entirely free of the other. Criminal law and procedure 
was thought to be the province of prosecutors, criminal defense 
attorneys, and the state and federal judges who oversee criminal 
prosecutions every day. Immigration law, in contrast, was confined to 
immigration courts housed within the executive branch of the federal 
government and staffed by immigration attorneys, immigration judges, 
and prosecutors employed for many years by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) and now the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) or Department of Justice. 
 
That division has undeniably become a historical relic. The world of 
criminal courthouses has collided with the world of immigration 
courthouses. The substantive criminal law that defines what constitutes 
a state or federal crime has increasingly come to turn on a person’s 
immigration status. Criminal procedure norms embodied in court rules 
and constitutional amendments have made special allowances for 
immigration law enforcement concerns and the citizenship status of 
defendants. Meanwhile, immigration law now frequently turns to a 
migrant’s criminal history to dictate whether imprisonment is merited 
while the government decides whether to mete out immigration law’s 
greatest sanction, deportation, and its close cousin, exclusion from the 
United States.55 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. Simon, supra note 1, at 584. 
 53. García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1361 (“According to Attorney General William 
French Smith, there was no other way to stop them from coming: ‘Detention of aliens seeking 
asylum was necessary to discourage people like the Haitians from setting sail in the first 
place.’”); Simon, supra note 1, at 584. 
 54. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 1. 
 55. Id. at 1–2. 
156 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:145 
 
As the law began to treat violations of immigration law more harshly and more 
punitively, and in many ways linked them to violations of criminal law, the carceral 
component of enforcement began to take shape.56 
The integration of criminal and immigration enforcement began in the 1980s, 
during the height of the War on Drugs, when Congress enacted a series of laws 
requiring the detention of a certain group of noncitizens.57 Confinement authority 
grew again in 1996 with the federal government’s enactment of the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).58 These two laws “marked a ‘seismic 
change’ in immigration detention—one from which the federal government has not 
turned.”59 While AEDPA and IIRIRA may have had the greatest impact in the 
shortest amount of time, through all of these laws—enacted and implemented over 
the course of under two decades—the government expanded the categories and types 
of crimes that could trigger removal proceedings and the classes of noncitizens for 
whom detention was mandatory.60 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. Id. at 240–42 (“By way of comparison, the INS had the capacity to detain 
approximately 1,700 migrants on average per day in 1982 and about 7,000 in 1990. By the end 
of the century, the agency held just shy of 20,000 each day. Ten years later, . . . the average 
daily population had again grown by 10,000. . . . Much of this growth can be attributed to the 
increasingly punitive views of immigration law violators that started in the 1980s and have yet 
to abate. In the last three decades, . . . Congress and multiple presidential administrations have 
intertwined criminal law and immigration law so that tactics traditionally associated with one 
are now prominent features of the other. In this case, criminal punishment’s long reliance on 
incarceration as a means of deterring—theoretically at least—and punishing undesirable 
conduct has become an accepted part of immigration law enforcement.”).  
 57. García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1361–62 (“Relying in large part on the growing 
desire to fight drugs, Congress enacted a series of laws between 1986 and 1994 that set the 
legislative groundwork for the expansive immigration detention apparatus that exists today: 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) 
of 1986, the Refugee Assistance Extension Act of 1986, a 1986 joint congressional resolution, 
the ADAA of 1988, the Crime Control Act of 1990, the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 
90), and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.”); Emily Ryo, 
Fostering Legal Cynicism Through Immigration Detention, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 999, 1005–06 
(2017).  
 58. García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1369–70 (“It was simply a matter of time before 
the vast increase in the penal prison population experienced in the 1980s came to immigration. 
Fifteen years after the INS subjected Haitians to mandatory detention and ten years after the 
ADAA of 1986 began entangling immigration detention and the drug war, the well-known 
duo of 1996 laws, AEDPA and IIRIRA, changed the face of immigration law.”) (footnotes 
omitted).  
 59. Id. at 1370, 1370–72 (detailing impact of AEDPA and IIRIRA on U.S. immigration 
detention legal framework). 
 60. RYO & PEACOCK, supra note 10, at 6; Heeren, supra note 22, at 610–11 (“In the wake 
of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed two laws that toughened deportation 
provisions and immigration detention. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (‘AEDPA’) greatly expanded both the definition of ‘aggravated felony’ and the 
categories of immigrants subject to mandatory detention. After the passage of AEDPA, 
immigrants who had been convicted of multiple crimes involving moral turpitude, controlled 
substances offenses, firearms offenses, and certain national security-related offenses became 
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As a result of these three developments beginning in the 1980s, the modern U.S. 
immigration detention system emerged from nearly nothing to become one of the 
most significant components of this country’s system of mass incarceration in five 
decades. In 1955, the government held just four people in immigration custody.61 In 
1973, the average daily number of people detained was 2,370; in 1980, it was 4,062.62 
By 2001, more than 200,000 people were being confined each year.63 By 2011, that 
total had doubled.64 Annual figures have grown steadily since then in response to the 
government’s sweeping authority to take away people’s liberty while they are 
awaiting a decision as to whether they will be permitted to remain within this 
country’s borders.65 
B.  Confinement Authority 
Today, the federal government’s system of immigration incarceration is a 
sweeping, multi-agency affair. Multiple components of executive-branch agencies 
are responsible for executing federal civil immigration laws and are statutorily 
authorized—and in some cases required—to confine people whose lives in some way 
touch those laws. Of those components, the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
 
subject to detention during removal proceedings without possibility of bond. Soon after the 
passage of AEDPA, Congress passed another law that expanded the scope of mandatory 
detention: the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(‘IIRIRA’). IIRIRA expanded the increasingly bloated aggravated felony category, and thus 
mandatory detention, to encompass still more types of crimes. After the passage of IIRIRA, 
Congress codified the immigration detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1226.”) (footnotes 
omitted); Ryo, supra note 57, at 1006 (“In 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act significantly 
broadened the use of mandatory detention by widening its net over a larger class of 
noncitizens.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 61. Minian, supra note 22. 
 62. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 23, at 10. 
 63. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 8 (“By 2001, over 200,000 people were being 
detained each year while they waited to learn whether they would be allowed to remain in the 
United States.”).  
 64. García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1348 (“In fiscal year 2011, for the first time in the 
nation’s history, more than 400,000 people were confined while they waited to learn whether 
they would be allowed to remain in the United States.”).  
 65. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 8 (“The immigration detention population has 
continued to grow steadily since [2001]. In fiscal year 2011, for example, 429,247 people were 
detained pending immigration proceedings. Meanwhile, Congress now requires that ICE pay 
for a minimum of 34,000 beds per night, almost guaranteeing that the historically anomalous 
annual detention population of recent years will not become a momentary blip.”); García 
Hernández, supra note 9, at 1382 (“Today, immigration detention represents the single most 
common confinement that occurs in the United States. In fiscal year 2012, the Department of 
Homeland Security detained 477,523 individuals while removal proceedings were pending or 
as they waited for actual removal from the country. . . . [R]ecent years have seen similarly 
large numbers confined: 429,247 in FY 2011, 363,064 in FY 2010, and 383,524 in FY 2009. 
In 2008 ICE claimed a ‘record total of 378,582, representing a 22 percent increase from 2007.’ 
That year, in turn, it reported detaining 311,169, a 21 percent rise from the previous year and 
itself a record at the time.”) (footnotes omitted).  
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the one responsible for the largest 
numbers of people in immigration confinement.66  
ICE’s authority to incarcerate people falls into two distinct categories: mandatory 
detention authority and discretionary detention authority.67 Between the two forms 
of authority, a significant proportion of people whose lives intersect in some way 
with the nation’s immigration-enforcement system are at risk of detention. 
Pursuant to its so-called mandatory detention authority,68 the government shall 
take into custody69 any noncitizen who the government has “reason to believe is 
removable for almost every crime-based reason, including crimes involving moral 
turpitude, controlled substance offenses, and aggravated felonies,”70 as well as 
“certain classes of ‘arriving aliens,’ including those seeking asylum who have not 
yet passed their credible fear determination.”71 This provision provides no basis for 
an immigration judge or other independent arbiter to consider bond or otherwise 
release someone who is detained.72 More than half of the people experiencing 
immigration confinement are held pursuant to this sweeping detention authority.73 
The law also obligates the government to confine people who have been ordered 
removed during the period between the entering of the final removal order and the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 66. García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1382 (“Today, immigration detention represents 
the single most common confinement that occurs in the United States. In fiscal year 2012, the 
Department of Homeland Security detained 477,523 individuals while removal proceedings 
were pending or as they waited for actual removal from the country. . . . [R]ecent years have 
seen similarly large numbers confined: 429,247 in FY 2011, 363,064 in FY 2010, and 383,524 
in FY 2009. In 2008, ICE claimed a ‘record total of 378,582, representing a 22 percent increase 
from 2007.’ That year, in turn, it reported detaining 311,169, a 21 percent rise from the 
previous year and itself a record at the time.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 67. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 95–102; Ryo, supra note 57, at 1009–10 
(describing discretionary and mandatory detention authority). 
 68. The contention that this provision mandates detention is dubious. As Professor García 
Hernández explains, the statute provides that the government shall take into custody any 
person falling into one or more of the enumerated categories. Custody, however, does not 
traditionally or necessarily mean detention but includes any number of ways in which the 
government may deprive a person of her liberty. See GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 
101. 
 69. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 236(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012). 
 70. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 99–100; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); Ryo, 
supra note 57, at 1009 (explaining that the INA requires detention of “noncitizens, including 
lawful permanent residents, convicted of certain crimes enumerated in the INA,” also known 
as “triggering offenses”). 
 71. Ryo, supra note 57, at 1009. 
 72. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 100; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (“No court 
may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the 
detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.”). But 
see Ryo, supra note 57, at 1010. 
 73. Ryo, supra note 57, at 1009–10 (“According to one report, about 66% of noncitizens 
in immigration detention were held under the mandatory detention provisions in 2009.”).  
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actual removal74 and those who the government has “reasonable grounds to believe” 
pose a national security threat.75 
Pursuant to its discretionary authority, the government may arrest anyone it 
believes is removable from the United States and detain the person pending a 
decision on his or her removability.76 Under this authority, an authorized ICE officer 
may release the noncitizen on conditional parole or a bond77 upon a showing by the 
noncitizen that he or she is not a flight risk or a danger to the community.78 If ICE 
denies that initial custody determination, the person may seek the immigration 
court’s review of ICE’s decision.79 The immigration court’s bond decision may be 
appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).80 The BIA’s bond 
determination is not subject to further review and is therefore final.81 
Critically, all of the above-discussed authority under which the federal 
government may detain people is purportedly civil in nature. That is, immigration 
confinement is somehow different than punitive incarceration because immigration 
laws are civil, sanctions for violating immigration laws (for example, deportation) 
are civil, and, therefore, detention in furtherance of executing immigration laws is 
civil.82 This premise on which immigration detention authority is exercised is 
discussed more in Part III. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B); see also GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 102 (“Not 
surprisingly, the INA requires detention of migrants ordered removed. According to the 
statute, DHS is to remove individuals from the United States within ninety days of a removal 
order becoming final, a window of time called the ‘removal period.’ After that ninety-day 
removal period, a detained migrant may be released under DHS supervision. Through a 
complicated review process governed by both the statute and regulations, designated 
immigration officials essentially gauge a detained migrant’s likelihood to endanger the public. 
Naturally, a detainee’s criminal record forms a significant part of this assessment.”) (citations 
omitted).  
 75. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a)(1)–(3) (authorizing the Attorney General to take into custody a 
noncitizen suspected of terrorism “if the Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe  
that the [noncitizen] (A) is described in [one of the relevant sections] of this title; or (B) is 
engaged in any other activity that endangers the national security of the United States.”). 
 76. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1).  
 77. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A)–(B). 
 78. Detention of Aliens Prior to Order of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8).  
 79. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1). 
 80. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(f). 
 81. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). But see Ryo, supra note 57 at 1009 (explaining that while the 
bond determination is not judicially reviewable, a detainee may seek habeas review to 
challenge the legality of his or her detention). 
 82. See Lima-Marín & Jefferis, supra note 6, at 11. 
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C. Confinement Profiteering 
Not only is the U.S. immigration detention system the largest in the world,83 it is 
the world’s most privatized.84 Nearly 400,000 people are incarcerated under the 
government’s immigration detention authority each year, an annual figure that has 
seen substantial growth annually.85 The average daily population of people in 
immigration confinement has also increased exponentially in the past two decades,86 
reaching nearly 40,500 people per day in 2017.87 The government requested funding 
for 52,000 daily beds in fiscal year 2019;88 after an intense budget debate during the 
2018–19 government shutdown, Congress declined ICE’s request and authorized 
detention-bed funding at 2018 levels—40,500 per day—in spite of Democrats’ 
efforts to reduce the number of detention beds to 35,400 per day.89 Notwithstanding 
Congress’s appropriation, ICE regularly detains more people than its funding 
permits.90 
According to a 2018 report, ICE relies on more than 630 sites throughout the 
country to confine people under its immigration-enforcement authority.91 Many of 
these facilities are state prisons or local jails contracting with the federal government 
to confine people for immigration-related reasons among those the jurisdiction 
confines under its own authority.92 Others are prisons managed directly by the federal 
government. Others still, are for-profit prisons run by private corporations and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 23, at 10–11 (“During the last thirty years, both the 
federal and state governments have increasingly tapped their powers to incarcerate people for 
how they move across borders. As a result, the United States has the world’s largest immigrant 
detention system, in which upward of half a million people annually now spend time locked 
up because the government claims they violated immigration law.”). 
 84. SMALL, supra note 8, at 2 (“[I]n addition to being remarkable for its size, the U.S. 
immigration detention system is an outlier for the degree to which it has been privatized.”).  
 85. See supra notes 8, 64 and accompanying text. 
 86. See supra notes 8, 64 and accompanying text. 
 87. MARY SMALL & HEIDI ALTMAN, DET. WATCH NETWORK & NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE 
CTR., ICE LIES: PUBLIC DECEPTION, PRIVATE PROFIT 2 (2018).  
 88. See, e.g., Nick Miroff, Why Immigration Detention Beds Became a New Issue in 
Trump Border Wall Fight, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2019, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/why-immigration-detention-beds-are-the-new 
-front-in-trump-border-wall-fight/2019/02/11/9c8e6d2a-2e15-11e9-813a-0ab2f17e305b 
_story.html [https://perma.cc/724Y-TNDV]. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. (“At a time when record numbers of Central American families have been showing 
up at the border, the number of people held in ICE custody has soared to nearly 50,000 per 
day, far above the number of beds Congress has funded.”). 
 91. RYO & PEACOCK, supra note 10, at 1. 
 92. Id. at 11 (“In fiscal year 2015, ICE used 638 facilities to detain noncitizens, including 
juveniles. By far, the largest category—43 percent—were facilities with intergovernmental 
service agreements (IGSAs). IGSAs are agreements between the federal government and a 
state or local government to provide detention beds in jails, prisons, or other local or state 
government detention facilities. These facilities are government owned, but they may be 
operated by either local or state agencies or by for-profit companies.”).  
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designed exclusively to detain people in the custody of immigration-enforcement 
authorities—the focus of this Article.  
Today, approximately two-thirds of the people comprising the annual detained 
population total are confined in private, for-profit immigration prisons at some point 
during their incarceration.93 Likewise, on any given day in the United States, a 
similar two-thirds of all people in the government’s civil custody for migration-
related reasons are living behind the walls of a prison constructed to generate income 
and turn a profit for its shareholders.94 Those people in private facilities are often 
confined for significantly longer periods of time than people in ICE-run prisons or 
facilities run by state or local governments.95 
The private, for-profit prison sector and the immigration incarceration system are 
inextricable. Private migration-related confinement dates as far back as the 
nineteenth century, when the federal government required shipping companies to 
keep noncitizen passengers on board arriving ships while officials processed their 
admission into the country.96 The first privately owned prison in the United States 
was an immigration prison.97 In 1994, in the wake of the above-discussed migration 
of Cuban and Haitian migrants and refugees,98 the Corrections Corporation of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 93. Madison Pauly, Trump’s Immigration Crackdown Is a Boom Time for Private 
Prisons, MOTHER JONES (May–June 2018), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/05/trumps-immigration-crackdown-is-a-boom 
-time-for-private-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/95Q8-4DGW]. 
 94. Marouf, supra note 8, at 2142–43 (“On any given day, 37,000 noncitizens are held in 
immigration detention centers across the country, of whom 25,000 do not yet have a final order 
of removal. Nearly three-quarters of these detainees are held in facilities run by private prison 
corporations.”); GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 23, at 15 (“In immigration enforcement, 
private prisons have an outsized presence. Sixty-five percent of ICE detainees are held in 
private facilities.”). 
 95. RYO & PEACOCK, supra note 10, at 3 (“Confinement in privately operated facilities . 
. . was associated with significantly longer detention.”). 
 96. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 23, at 24 (“With the federal government’s demand 
that ships keep passengers on board, immigration imprisonment had begun, and it started in 
the hands of private corporations.”). 
 97. SILKY SHAH, MARY SMALL & CAROL WU, DET. WATCH NETWORK & CTR. FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, BANKING ON DETENTION: LOCAL LOCKUP QUOTAS AND THE 
IMMIGRANT DRAGNET  3 (2015); see Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 
55 DUKE L.J. 437, 457 (2005). But see id. at 450–452 (discussing eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century leasing and other arrangements between governments and private contractors to 
incarcerate people). 
 98. While the formation of CoreCivic was in response to Cuban and Haitian migration in 
the early 1980s, the private prison industry grew out the antebellum practice of forced labor 
on prison plantations, which itself grew out of the practice of slavery. Some plantations were 
privately owned; others were government-run. All, however, profited from the labor of 
enslaved people, primarily from black men. See, e.g., SHANE BAUER, AMERICAN PRISON 19 
(2018) (“Like prison systems throughout the South, Texas’s grew directly out of slavery. After 
the Civil War the state’s economy was in disarray, and cotton and sugar planters suddenly 
found themselves without hands they could force to work. Fortunately for them, the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which abolished slavery, left a loophole. It said that ‘neither slavery nor 
involuntary servitude’ shall exist in the United States ‘except as punishment for a crime.’ As 
long as black men were convicted of crimes, Texas could lease all of its prisoners to private 
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America (CCA), now known as CoreCivic,99 opened the Houston Processing Center, 
a hotel converted to an immigration detention center, in Houston, Texas.100 CCA co-
founder Tom Beasley described on national radio the casual manner in which he 
launched his exceedingly profitable business model in partnership with former 
pastor101 Don Hutto:  
Don Hutto and I went down to Houston on New Year’s Eve in 1983. We 
rented a car at the airport and drove around the major thoroughfares to 
find somewhere to put 200 illegal criminal aliens by February 1st. 
Literally, we stopped in ten motels, then finally about 3am found one that 
might work. I asked if they would be interested in selling or leasing the 
motel. And after negotiating with the owner for several hours, he finally 
agreed.102 
Three years later, the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, now known as the 
GEO Group, Inc., received its first contract to run an immigration detention center.103 
                                                                                                                 
 
cotton and sugar plantations and companies running lumber camps and coal mines, and 
building railroads. It did this for five decades after the abolition of slavery, but the state 
eventually became jealous of the revenue private companies and planters were earning from 
its prisoners. So, between 1899 and 1918, the state bought ten plantations of its own and began 
running them as prisons.”). 
 99. Devlin Barrett, Private-Prison Firm CCA to Rename Itself CoreCivic, WALL ST. J., 
(Oct. 28, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/private-prison-firm-cca-to-rename 
-itself-corecivic-1477666800 [https://perma.cc/M3BQ-U4W5]. 
 100. SHAH, SMALL & WU, supra note 97, at 3; Christine Bacon, The Evolution of 
Immigration Detention in the UK: The Involvement of Private Prison Companies 10 (Refugee 
Studies Ctr., Working Paper No. 27, 2005); Madison Pauly, A Brief History of America’s 
Private Prison Industry, MOTHER JONES (July–Aug. 2016), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/history-of-americas-private-prison-industry 
-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/BT82-JCSD]. 
 101. BAUER, supra note 98, at 21 (“Before running prisons, Hutto had been a pastor, 
studied history, spent two years in the US Army, and did graduate work in education at the 
American University in Washington, DC.”). 
 102. Bacon, supra note 100, at 10; see also BAUER, supra note 98, at 14–15  (describing 
CoreCivic training video: “In the video, Hutto and Beasley tell their company’s origin story. 
In 1983, they recount, they won ‘the first contract ever to design, build, finance, and operate a 
secure correctional facility in the world.’ . . . [Hutto] recalls the story of obtaining their first 
prison contract like an old man giving a blow-by-blow accounting of his winning high school 
touchdown. Rushed for time, he and Beasley convinced the owner of a motel in Houston to 
lease it to them, eventually hiring ‘all his family’ as staff to seal the deal. They then quickly 
surrounded the motel with a twelve-foot fence topped with coiled barbed wire. They left up 
the Day Rates Available sign. ‘We opened the facility on Super Bowl Sunday the end of that 
January,’ Hutto recalls. ‘So about ten o’clock that night we start receiving inmates. I actually 
took their pictures and fingerprinted them. Several other people walked them to their “rooms,” 
if you will, and we got our first day’s pay for eighty-seven undocumented aliens.’ Both men 
chuckle.”). 
 103. Pauly, supra note 100. 
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And with that, the industry’s two primary players today launched what has become 
an empire.104   
Immigration confinement is an increasingly lucrative business.105 In 2018, the 
GEO Group reported more than $2.3 billion in revenue, compared to just above $2.2 
billion in 2017 and nearly $2.18 billion in 2016.106 CoreCivic reported more than 
$1.8 billion in total revenue for 2018 after generating more than $1.7 billion in 
2017,107 and reports continued growth through the first quarter of 2019.108 GEO’s 
CEO received compensation totaling $7 million in 2018.109 In recent years, often 
when the Trump administration announces a new tough-on-immigration policy, these 
companies’ shareholders see a rapid spike in stock value.110 While both GEO and 
CoreCivic operate in an array of jurisdictions around the world—they do not profit 
                                                                                                                 
 
 104. See, e.g., CARL TAKEI, MICHAEL TAN & JOANNE LIN, ACLU, SHUTTING DOWN THE 
PROFITEERS: WHY AND HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY SHOULD STOP USING 
PRIVATE PRISONS 10 (2016). 
 105. See, e.g., SHAH, SMALL & WU, supra note 97, at 3–4; TAKEI, TAN & LIN, supra note 
104, at 10 (“These trends have enriched private prison investors. In 2008, the two biggest 
private prison companies—Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group 
(GEO)—received a combined $307 million in revenue from ICE detention contracts. By 2015, 
that number had more than doubled, to more than $765 million.”);  Esther Fung, Donald 
Trump Has Been Very Good for Publicly Listed Prison Owners, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2019, 
9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-has-been-very-good-for-publicly-
listed 
-prison-owners-11551189601 [https://perma.cc/8CK8-L76U]; Nomaan Merchant, New Deal 
Keeps Open Facility That Detains Immigrant Families, AP NEWS (Oct. 17, 2018), 
https://www.apnews.com/cfe75057db534f28aecd0a01e04f9786 [https://perma.cc/FX3H-
BJT8]; Pauly, supra note, 93; Carli Pierson, Don’t Be Fooled by Trump’s Caravan Rhetoric – 
It’s Much More Profitable to Incarcerate Migrants Than to Stop Them at the Border, 
INDEPENDENT (Oct. 31, 2018, 11:30 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/trump-
caravan-migrants-detention-centres-ice-child-separation-a8610146.html [https://perma.cc/ 
3727-4JJ]; Jackie Speier, Immigration Detention Is a Profitable Business, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 
24, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/Immigrant-detention-is-a-
profitable-business-13334050.php [https://perma.cc/YAL6-NC5L]. But see Danielle C. 
Jefferis, Private Prisons, Private Governance: Essay on Developments in Private-Sector 
Resistance to Privatized Immigration Detention, 15 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y (forthcoming 
2019) (discussing recent developments with respect to financing withdrawal and other private-
sector resistance to privatized immigration detention). 
 106. THE GEO GROUP, INC., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2018). 
 107. CORECIVIC, INC., CORECIVIC 2018 ANNUAL REPORT: FORM 10-K 54 (2018). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Simply Wall St., How Much Is The GEO Group, Inc.’s (NYSE:GEO) CEO Getting 
Paid?, YAHOO! FINANCE (May 8, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/much-geo-group 
-inc-nyse-163819269.html [https://perma.cc/2WVZ-MY7P]. 
 110. See, e.g., John Washington, Trump’s Immigration Policy ‘Fever Dream,’ THE NATION 
(Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/trumps-immigration-policy-fever-dream/ 
[https://perma.cc/S8JQ-LHTN] (“[B]etween the announcement of the ‘zero tolerance’ policy 
and DHS’s June 22 request for information about the possibility of detaining an additional 
15,000 people in family jails, the stocks of Geo Group and CoreCivic, the two largest for-
profit immigration-detention corporations, increased 5.9 percent and 8.3 percent, 
respectively.”). 
164 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:145 
 
exclusively from immigration confinement—their contracts with ICE total 
approximately $2 billion each year.111 
The driving force behind the private-prison industry’s ballooning profits is ICE’s 
“detention quota” system. Since 2007, Congress has appropriated funding for DHS 
on the condition that the agency maintains a certain number of detention beds.112 
While the agency is not required to consistently fill the beds, ICE has interpreted the 
provision to function as a de facto quota, using it to justify its detention practices.113 
The assumption that all funded detention beds must be filled at all times incentivizes 
ICE to arrest and detain whenever possible to fill the beds, many of which are in for-
profit prisons. The more beds that are filled, the more the prison corporation collects.  
The U.S. system of immigration confinement is unparalleled around the world, 
both in its scope and its privatization. Driven by the agency’s perception that every 
bed must be filled, ICE continues to arrest and incarcerate more and more people 
every year. And with the government’s increasing reliance on for-profit prisons, the 
executives and shareholders of the corporations managing those prisons reap 
significant monetary rewards, while the people inside the prisons suffer in abysmal 
conditions of confinement with few remedies to hold their jailers accountable, as the 
next Part demonstrates.  
II. THE ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEM: GOVERNMENT-RUN VERSUS FOR-PROFIT 
PRISONS 
The U.S. Constitution is the nation’s bulwark in ensuring the conditions in which 
the government confines people are safe and humane. To be sure, “the Constitution 
does not mandate comfortable prisons . . . .”114 But “neither does it permit inhumane 
ones . . . .”115 Carceral punishment is bound by “broad and idealistic concepts of 
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . . .”116 Those bounds, many of 
which are enshrined in the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment,117 ensure the government does not inflict punishments that are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. See, e.g., John Burnett, Big Money as Private Immigrant Jails Boom, NPR (Nov. 21, 
2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/21/565318778/big-money-as-private 
-immigrant-jails-boom [https://perma.cc/QEX8-6CXN] (“ICE spends more than $2 billion a 
year on immigrant detention through private jails . . . .”). 
 112. Marouf, supra note 8, at 2145.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). 
 115. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). 
 116. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 
579 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968)). 
 117. This Part focuses on the Eighth Amendment because that provision embodies most of 
the Constitution’s substantive due process protections for prisoners and is the one on which 
most prisoners rely when seeking to regulate the conditions of their incarceration. See, e.g., 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849–50 (1998); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 
312, 327 (1986). Other Bill of Rights provisions apply in prison as well, though to varying 
degrees. See, e.g.,  Ky. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459–463 (1989) 
(discussing prisoners’ procedural due process protections under Fourteenth Amendment); 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (applying First Amendment to prisoner’s speech-related 
claims); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (setting forth Fourth Amendment balancing 
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“incompatible with ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society’ . . . or which ‘involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain.’”118 And while it is the Fifth Amendment that protects civil, immigration 
detainees, many courts have concluded that detainees must be afforded at minimum 
the Eighth Amendment’s protections.119 
Jurisprudence regarding the application of the Eighth Amendment to carceral 
conditions has evolved. Courts have expanded and constricted the contours of the 
right, as well as the remedies available to prisoners who prove a violation of the right, 
in response to public policies concerning crime, sentencing, and incarceration. But 
what has remained constant as the doctrine has developed is that remedies are 
available to incarcerated people to address certain elements of their environment that 
society deems incompatible with social and constitutional values. Among those 
paramount values are the right to adequate medical care and a safe prison 
environment.  
One of the government’s primary responsibilities in ensuring its carceral 
punishment scheme adheres to the Eighth Amendment’s prescription is to “provide 
medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.”120 Confinement, by 
definition, subjects a person to near-total reliance on the government to meet her 
needs: “if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.”121  
In the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce physical torture 
or a lingering death, . . . the evils of most immediate concern to the 
drafters of the Amendment. In less serious cases, denial of medical care 
may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any 
penological purpose.122  
Such unnecessary suffering, according to the Supreme Court, was long incompatible 
with “contemporary standards of decency.”123 Thus, prisons and prison officials who 
are deliberately indifferent to a person’s serious medical needs violate the Eighth 
Amendment.124  
Prisons and prison officials also violate the Eighth Amendment when they fail to 
protect a person from violence at the hands of other prisoners.125 “[H]aving stripped 
[prisoners] of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to 
outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take 
its course.”126 Again, a person’s unnecessary suffering, even a person behind prison 
                                                                                                                 
 
test for claims of invasion of privacy). 
 118. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102–03 (citations omitted). 
 119. See, e.g., Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 120. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth 
Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishment” clause as applicable to the states. See generally 
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (tracing history of incorporation of Eighth 
Amendment protections).  
 121. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. 
 122. Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 106; see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993).  
 125. See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1993). 
 126. Id.   
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walls, does not align with contemporary standards of decency.127 Thus, prisons and 
prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent 
to conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner.128 
While the Constitution states no limits on its application of the rights above, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the document’s text in ways that limit the scope 
of this protection based on the type of prison a person finds him or herself in. The 
consequences of this jurisprudential interpretation fall disproportionately on one 
class of prisoners—those in the federal government’s custody but confined in for-
profit prisons. People incarcerated in public prisons (that is, the facilities operated 
directly by the government), no matter whether they are run by local, state, or federal 
authorities, have more robust remedies at their disposal to enforce their rights to 
humane conditions of confinement than do federal prisoners in for-profit prisons. 
And today, most of those federal prisoners are people held under the federal 
government’s so-called civil detention authority for alleged violations of 
immigration law. 
This Part outlines the constitutional remedies available to prisoners in public 
prisons and prisoners in for-profit prisons operating under federal authority. The Part 
then concludes by comparing the remedies available to each category of prisoners, 
demonstrating the Constitution’s disparate reach. 
A. Constitutional Tort Remedies and Government-Run Prisons 
Broadly speaking, federal courts have the power to award two types of relief for 
violations of the law: money damages for past violations and equitable relief for 
ongoing violations (usually in the form of an injunction or declaratory relief). And 
this is generally true for people confined in government-run prisons who seek to 
enforce their constitutional rights in federal courts: depending on the nature of the 
constitutional violation they allege, they may seek relief in the form of monetary 
damages and/or equitable relief. 
Remedies for constitutional violations are the most robust for state prisoners who 
may bring constitutional actions in federal court under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 
Congress passed section 1983 “at the height of the tumultuous Reconstruction era 
that followed the Civil War . . . to provide a federal forum for civil rights claims.”129 
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for any state prisoner130 seeking to enforce 
his constitutional rights against state officials in the form of monetary and equitable 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. Id. (“Prison conditions may be restrictive and even harsh, . . . but gratuitously allowing 
the beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no legitimate penological objective.” 
(citations and quotations omitted)).  
 128. Id. at 834. 
 129.  Nicole B. Godfrey, Holding Federal Prison Officials Accountable: The Case for 
Recognizing a Damages Remedy for Federal Prisoners’ Free Exercise Claims, 96 NEB. L. 
REV. 924, 931 (2018) (internal quotations and footnotes omitted). 
 130. The law is not limited to claims brought by prisoners. Rather, it permits anyone within 
the United States to sue government officials acting under color of state or local law for 
constitutional violations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191–
192 (1961) (first recognizing availability of damages remedy for actions brought against state 
and local officials under Section 1983).  
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relief.131  Although the history of section 1983 reaches back to the nineteenth century, 
the availability of a constitutional tort remedy for state prison officials’ violations of 
prisoners’ constitutional rights has been unquestioned for decades.132 
For federal prisoners in government-run prisons, the remedies are not as robust as 
those available to state prisoners under section 1983.133 Federal prisoners may bring 
actions in federal court for equitable relief—injunctions and declaratory 
judgments—directly under the Constitution, and they may seek damages under 
certain “implied” causes of action for constitutional torts.134 This implied damages 
remedy to redress federal officials’ constitutional violations derives from the 
Supreme Court’s Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics.135 Explaining the lead-up to Bivens, Professor Nicole B. Godfrey writes,  
Prior to Bivens, victims of constitutional violations by federal officers 
could seek relief only in state courts through common law suits for 
trespass against the federal agents. Yet, by the time Bivens reached the 
Court, several flaws in the original model had crystallized. 
. . . .  
In a 5–3 opinion, the Court held the Constitution itself provides a cause 
of action for damages for violations of the Fourth Amendment by 
individual federal agents. Specifically, the Court determined that so long 
as Congress had not provided an adequate alternative remedy for 
violation of the right at issue and so long as there were no special factors 
counseling the Court to hesitate acting in an area where Congress had 
not, private individuals whose constitutional rights had been violated by 
federal officers were entitled to pursue damages remedies in the federal 
courts.136 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. The sweeping scope of Section 1983 is worth repeating. The statute provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 132. See id. at 931 (“While § 1983 lay largely dormant for just under a century, the 
legislative history makes clear Congress intended the law provide monetary relief to victims 
of constitutional rights violations by state and local authorities.”). 
 133. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (applies only to officials acting under color of state or local 
law).  
 134. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
396–97 (1971). 
 135. 403 U.S. at 389. 
 136. Godfrey, supra note 129, at 932–34 (internal quotations and footnotes omitted). 
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Since Bivens, the Supreme Court has expanded the damages remedy in two other 
contexts, one of which is especially significant to federal prisoners.137 In Carlson v. 
Green, the mother of a prisoner who died while in Federal Bureau of Prisons custody 
due to inadequate medical care sued federal prison officials on behalf of the 
prisoner’s estate for the injuries her son endured while in their custody.138 After 
assessing whether any special factors counseled hesitation in recognizing a damages 
remedy, and analyzing whether Congress had created any adequate alternative 
remedies,139 the Court concluded the plaintiff could pursue a damages remedy for the 
constitutional tort.140 Carlson has been a landmark holding for federal prisoners 
seeking to enforce their Eighth-Amendment right to adequate medical care.  
Since Carlson, however, the Court has been increasingly reluctant to extend 
Bivens further.141 The recent decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi brings the future of Bivens 
squarely into question.142 A full analysis of Ziglar and the future of Bivens is beyond 
the scope of this Article. What remains the case, however, is federal prisoners 
confined in government-run prisons still have a tort remedy available to them for 
certain constitutional rights violations. 
B. Constitutional Tort Remedies and Private Prisons 
Two of the Court’s post-Bivens decisions limited the availability of constitutional 
tort remedies for prisoners confined in for-profit prisons while in the federal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 137. Id. at 934–35 (“In the period immediately following Bivens, both the Supreme Court 
and the lower federal courts extended the Bivens remedy to other constitutional violations. 
Notably, the federal courts extended Bivens to First Amendment Free Speech claims, First 
Amendment Freedom of Association claims, Fifth Amendment Equal Protection claims, Fifth 
Amendment Due Process claims, Sixth Amendment right-to-an-attorney claims, and Eighth 
Amendment prison-conditions claims. Of these, the Supreme Court itself expressly expanded 
Bivens to include employment-discrimination claims brought under an Equal Protection theory 
encompassed by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and cruel-and-unusual-
conditions claims brought under the Eighth Amendment.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 138. 446 U.S. 14, 16 (1980). 
 139. See Godfrey, supra note 129, at 936–37.  
 140. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18–23, 25.  
 141. Godfrey, supra note 129, at 937 (“Despite the Court’s unequivocal articulation of the 
need for a Bivens remedy in Carlson, the three-plus decades since Carlson reveal a Court 
reluctant to extend Bivens to new contexts. In some instances, the Court determined special 
factors exist which preclude an extension of Bivens. . . . In other instances, the Court conflated 
the special-factors exception and the adequate-alternative-remedy exception to conclude the 
existence of a congressional statute in a particular area is itself a factor ‘counseling judicial 
hesitation.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421–22 (1988) 
(“Our more recent decisions have responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens remedies 
be extended into new contexts. The absence of statutory relief for a constitutional violation, 
for example, does not by any means necessarily imply that courts should award money 
damages against the officers responsible for the violation.”).  
 142. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).  
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government’s custody:143 Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko144 and 
Minneci v. Pollard.145  
In Malesko, the plaintiff, John Malesko, was a federal prisoner in the custody of 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) who was designated to wait out the remainder 
of his criminal sentence in the Le Marquis Community Correctional Center (Le 
Marquis), a New York City halfway house146 operated by the for-profit prison 
company, Correctional Services Corporation (CSC).147 While in BOP custody, Mr. 
Malesko was diagnosed with a heart condition, for which he was prescribed 
medication.148 Because of his condition, Mr. Malesko was not supposed to engage in 
physical activity, including climbing stairs.149 Once he arrived at Le Marquis, 
however, halfway house officials assigned him to a room on the fifth floor and 
precluded him from using the elevator to reach his room from the lobby.150 While 
climbing the five flights of stairs on one occasion, Mr. Malesko suffered a heart 
                                                                                                                 
 
 143. Although the focus of this Article is on people in for-profit immigration prisons, 
federal prisoners waiting out a criminal sentence in private federal prisons also do not have a 
constitutional tort remedy at their disposal to address past violations of their rights. This is one 
example in the ever-expanding field of the ways in which federal prisoners are disadvantaged 
as compared to their state and local counterparts. A full discussion of this phenomenon is 
beyond the scope of this Article; I and others, however, have addressed aspects of the disparate 
treatment of federal prisoners in other work. See generally Godfrey, supra note 129, at 974 
(“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment rightly requires the states to protect and secure the individual 
rights and liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights in the same way it requires the federal 
government to do so. . . . [B]y imposing inconsistent remedial consequences for violations of 
those rights on state actors vis-à-vis federal actors, the federal courts ignore constitutional 
history and design meant to protect individuals from rights infringement by the federal 
government. In the prison setting, this results in federal prison officials escaping with no 
repercussions for violations of federally protected constitutional rights while state prison 
officials are held liable for the very same acts. Such a result stands constitutional design on its 
head . . . .”); Danielle C. Jefferis & Nicole B. Godfrey, Chapman v. Bureau of Prisons: 
Stopping the Venue Merry-Go-Round, 96 DENV. L. REV. F. 9, 9 (2018) (“The Federal Bureau 
of Prisons (BOP) is in a unique position to frustrate the federal venue statute. In contrast to 
most state departments of corrections, the BOP bears the unilateral power to transfer prisoners 
in its custody to prisons across federal judicial districts.”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 16 (“The 
consequences of this practice are significant; often, it risks leaving the prisoner-plaintiff in a 
district in which he does not have the means to continue to litigate his claim and, thus, permits 
the BOP to evade judicial review.”) (footnotes omitted); Allison L. Waks, Federal 
Incarceration by Contract in a Post-Minneci World: Legislation to Equalize the 
Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1065, 1066 (2013) (“The 
privatization of prisons has stripped certain federal prisoners of the ability to seek redress for 
violations of their constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment.”). 
 144. 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
 145. 565 U.S. 118 (2012). 
 146. For purposes of this discussion, a halfway house is treated just like a prison. While 
people assigned to a halfway house are under fewer liberty restrictions, they are nonetheless 
still in government custody and under government supervision. 
 147. 534 U.S. at 63–64.  
 148. Id. at 64.  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.  
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attack, fell, and injured himself.151 Several days prior to the fall, Mr. Malesko alleged, 
CSC staff had failed to refill his prescription medication.152 
Mr. Malesko filed a pro se action against CSC and several of its employees.153 
The district court dismissed the claim against the individual employees on statute of 
limitations grounds,154 so by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the 
question presented was “whether the implied damages action first recognized in 
Bivens . . . should be extended to allow recovery against a private corporation 
operating a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of Prisons.”155  
In a 5–4 decision authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court refused to extend 
Bivens to constitutional tort claims brought against private prison corporations.156  
First, relying on FDIC v. Meyer,157 the Court reasoned the core purpose of Bivens is 
to deter the officer who violates the constitutional right at issue, not the entity 
employing the officer.158 In FDIC, the Court recounted,  
We reasoned that if given the choice, plaintiffs would sue a federal 
agency instead of an individual who could assert qualified immunity as 
                                                                                                                 
 
 151. Id.  
 152. Malesko v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 229 F.3d 374, 376 (2d Cir. 2000).  
 153. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 64.  
 154. Id. at 65.  
 155. Id. at 63 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  
 156. Id. (“We decide here whether the implied damages action first recognized in Bivens . 
. . should be extended to allow recovery against a private corporation operating a halfway 
house under contract with the Bureau of Prisons. We decline to so extend Bivens.”) (citation 
omitted). Whether the Court should have even reached this question is, itself, questionable. 
According to the Court, Mr. Malesko’s complaint alleged CSC and the other defendants were 
“negligent in failing to obtain requisite medication for [respondent’s] condition and were 
further negligent by refusing [respondent] the use of the elevator.” Id. at 64–65 (quoting 
appellate record). The district court treated the complaint as raising claims under Bivens, 
despite the fact that Mr. Malesko plead negligence. See id. at 65. The Eighth Amendment’s 
standard for inadequate medical care has always been greater than negligence. See Estelle, 429 
U.S. at 105–106 (“[I]n the medical context, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical 
care cannot be said to constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ or to be 
‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’ Thus, a complaint that a physician has been 
negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical 
mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a 
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”). However, one reason the 
Court declined to extend the Bivens remedy was the availability of alternative remedies to Mr. 
Malesko: “[F]ederal prisoners in private facilities enjoy a parallel tort remedy that is 
unavailable to prisoners housed in Government facilities. . . . This case demonstrates as much, 
since respondent’s complaint in the District Court arguably alleged no more than a 
quintessential claim of negligence.” Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72–73 (citation omitted). The Court 
suggested the district court’s construction of Mr. Malesko’s complaint as one brought under 
the Eighth Amendment may have been wrong but then stated Mr. Malesko “accepted this 
theory of liability, and he has never sought relief on any other ground.” Id. at 73. Had the 
district court adhered to the liberal construction canon for pro se litigants, Mr. Malesko may 
have prevailed. 
 157. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).  
 158. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69 (citing Meyer, 510 U.S. at 484–86).  
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an affirmative defense. To the extent aggrieved parties had less incentive 
to bring a damages claim against individuals, “the deterrent effects of the 
Bivens remedy would be lost.”159 
Second, the Court noted that Mr. Malesko and other federal prisoners like him 
have alternative remedies available to redress injuries in federal court: “It was 
conceded at oral argument that alternative remedies are at least as great, and in many 
respects greater, than anything that could be had under Bivens.”160 For the Court, 
these adequate alternative remedies include a state tort negligence action, a federal 
suit for injunctive relief, and the BOP’s grievance program.161 According to the 
Court, the availability of these purported alternative remedies to a constitutional tort 
made Mr. Malesko’s situation “altogether different from Bivens, in which [the Court] 
found alternative state tort remedies to be ‘inconsistent or even hostile’ to a remedy 
inferred from the Fourth Amendment.”162  
According to the Malesko Court, Mr. Bivens may not have had a choice to resist 
the requests of federal law enforcement officers knocking on his door; doing so may 
have implicated criminal charges.163 But not resisting their requests—letting them 
into his home—likely defeated any state tort remedies he would have had against 
those officers, such as trespass or invasion of privacy.164 Mr. Bivens, therefore, did 
not have the option to pursue alternative state tort remedies for the officers’ wrongful 
conduct, so recognition of the implied constitutional action was warranted.165 Mr. 
Malesko, in contrast, must merely make a “strategic choice” between pursuing a 
constitutional claim for deliberate indifference and a state tort claim for negligence. 
In that situation, the state tort claim is an adequate alternative to the implied 
constitutional tort.166  
Accordingly, Mr. Malesko was “not a plaintiff in search of a remedy.”167 Rather, 
he sought “a marked extension of Bivens, to contexts that would not advance Bivens’ 
core purpose of deterring individual officers from engaging in unconstitutional 
wrongdoing. The caution toward extending Bivens remedies into any new context, a 
caution consistently and repeatedly recognized for three decades, forecloses such an 
extension here.”168 Mr. Malesko’s constitutional tort claim against the for-profit 
prison corporation that confined him when he suffered his injury was dismissed.169  
                                                                                                                 
 
 159. Id. (quoting Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485).  
 160. Id. at 72. 
 161. Id. at 72–74. 
 162. Id. at 73 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 394 (1971)).  
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. (“Therefore, we reasoned in Bivens that other than an implied constitutional tort 
remedy, ‘there remain[ed] . . . but the alternative of resistance, which may amount to a 
crime.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395).  
 166. Id. at 73–74 (“Such logic [from Bivens] does not apply to [Mr. Malesko], whose claim 
of negligence or deliberate indifference requires no resistance to official action, and whose 
lack of alternative tort remedies was due solely to strategic choice.”).  
 167. Id. at 74. 
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. at 65–66. 
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The next case before the Court concerning the liability of for-profit prisons and 
federal prisoners was Minneci v. Pollard.170 In Minneci, the question presented for 
the Court was “whether [to] imply the existence of an Eighth Amendment-based 
damages action (a Bivens action) against employees of a privately operated federal 
prison.”171 In yet another blow to the constitutional rights of federal prisoners in 
private prisons, the Court resolved the circuit court split on the issue in the 
negative.172  
Mr. Pollard was a federal prisoner confined in a facility owned and operated by 
the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, now known as GEO.173 He slipped on a cart 
left in a doorway in the prison and, as he later learned, broke both elbows.174 Mr. 
Pollard sued Wackenhut employees working in the prison for varying ways in which, 
he alleged, the employees violated his Eighth Amendment rights while he was 
injured.175  
Mr. Pollard argued there was no need for the Court to ask whether an extension 
of Bivens was warranted because the Court had already decided in Carlson that 
federal prisoners may bring an Eighth Amendment claim against prison officials.176 
This premise—that federal prisoners are federal prisoners, no matter the type of 
facility in which they are confined (which is typically through no choice of their 
own)—was not as obvious to the Court. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, 
stated, “Carlson . . . was a case in which a federal prisoner sought damages from 
personnel employed by the government, not personnel employed by a private firm. 
And for present purposes that fact—of employment status—makes a critical 
difference.”177 
The critical difference was, similar to in Malesko, the existence of adequate 
alternative state tort remedies.178 The Court acknowledged state torts may not be on 
par with constitutional tort remedies but discounted that disparity quickly, finding 
that state tort law remedies provide “roughly similar incentives” for potential 
defendants to comply with the law and “roughly similar compensation” for victims 
of violations as constitutional torts do.179 In dispensing with the claim, the Court 
nodded to Mr. Pollard’s argument that there “may” be situations in which state tort 
law does not cover Eighth Amendment violations but dispensed with the notion 
quickly, concluding the issue of the adequacy of state tort law as a substitute for 
constitutional claims was better left “to another day.”180 Accordingly, a federal 
prisoner confined in a for-profit prison may not bring a constitutional tort action 
                                                                                                                 
 
 170. 565 U.S. 118 (2012). 
 171. Id. at 120. 
 172. Id. at 122, 125 (“[W]e conclude that Pollard cannot assert a Bivens claim.”). 
 173. Id. at 121. See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text. 
 174. 565 U.S. at 121. 
 175. Id. at 121–22.  
 176. Id. at 126. 
 177. Id. (citing Carlson v. Green 446 U.S. 14, 25 (1980)).  
 178. Id. at 127. 
 179. Id. at 130. 
 180. Id. 
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against the employees of the prison corporation for violating his rights; his remedies 
are relegated to state tort law.181 
With these two decisions, the Court carved out a class of prisoners for whom there 
is no constitutional tort remedy. Effectively, the Court marked these prisoners as 
those to whom the Constitution does not apply. The decisions dealt with 
constitutional tort claims brought by federal prisoners waiting out a sentence in for-
profit prisons after a criminal conviction. But in the years since the decisions, another 
class of prisoners has grown increasingly relevant—those held in for-profit prisons 
by federal immigration authorities—and they, likewise, are left with no constitutional 
tort remedy to seek redress of violations of their rights in custody. 
C. “Incongruous and Confusing” 
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Malesko, predicted that recognizing different 
constitutional standards for federal prisoners based purely on the type of prison 
confining them would be “incongruous and confusing.”182 Justice Ginsburg, 
dissenting in Minneci, echoed these concerns: “Were Pollard incarcerated in a 
federal- or state-operated facility, he would have a federal remedy for the Eighth 
Amendment violations he allege[d]. . . . I would not deny the same character of relief 
to Pollard, a prisoner placed by federal contract in a privately operated prison.”183 
Yet, this incongruous and confusing space is exactly where the state of the law for 
federal prisoners—including those in ICE custody—lies. The Eighth Amendment 
protects federal prisoners in the same way it protects state prisoners, and people in 
ICE custody are entitled to at least the same measure of constitutional protection.184 
Yet, the mechanisms for enforcing those rights markedly differ depending solely on 
the entity running the site of the constitutional violations. 
Roberto’s story at the outset of this Article is just one among many people’s 
struggles to obtain adequate medical care in private immigration detention facilities. 
Others have fared worse in recent months, succumbing to limb amputations, serious 
illnesses and infections, and even death.185 ICE has acknowledged at least 185 deaths 
                                                                                                                 
 
 181. Id. at 131 (“For these reasons, where, as here, a federal prisoner seeks damages from 
privately employed personnel working at a privately operated federal prison, where the 
conduct allegedly amounts to a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and where that conduct is 
of a kind that typically falls within the scope of traditional state tort law (such as the conduct 
involving improper medical care at issue here), the prisoner must seek a remedy under state 
tort law. We cannot imply a Bivens remedy in such a case.”) (emphasis added).  
 182. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 82 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“The Court, however, has recognized sound jurisprudential reasons for parallelism [between 
Section 1983 and Bivens], as different standards for claims against state and federal actors 
‘would be incongruous and confusing.’”). 
 183. Minneci, 565 U.S. at 132 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 184. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 165 (3d Cir. 2005) (relying on Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), to conclude pretrial detainees are entitled to greater protections 
than those afforded under Eighth Amendment).  
 185. See, e.g., Conor McCormick-Cavanagh, Democrats Probe ICE About Medical 
Conditions at Aurora Detention Facility, WESTWORD (Feb. 28, 2019, 1:54 PM), 
https://www.westword.com/news/jason-crow-sends-ice-letter-about-medical-conditions-at 
-aurora-detention-facility-11252339 [https://perma.cc/EYE2-CJNR]; Kassi Nelson, Trans 
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in immigration prisons and jails between October 2003 and July 2018.186 Twenty-
two people have died in ICE custody in the last two years.187 Others, still, have 
endured physical abuse at the hands of staff and otherwise harsh conditions of 
confinement.188 If Roberto had found himself in a facility run directly by ICE or in a 
state or local facility contracting with ICE—that is, a government-run prison—he 
would have had legal options to pursue relief against the personnel who were 
responsible for his suffering. But because Roberto happened to find himself in a 
private facility, he was relegated to state court remedies. Roberto’s and his 
counterparts’ remedies are incongruous and confusing; the for-profit prisons and 
their staff are constitutionally unaccountable. 
III. THE NEED TO CONSTITUTIONALIZE PRIVATE IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
There is little to no tangible difference in the experience of people in for-profit, 
federal immigration detention and people incarcerated in federal and state prisons 
and local jails.189 The latter is held to a constitutional standard; the former is not. But 
                                                                                                                 
 
Woman Dies in ICE Custody; Family Sues, KOB4 (Nov. 27, 2018, 4:13 PM), 
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https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/22-immigrants-died-ice-detention-centers 
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-at-ice-detention-center-in-aurora-10941507 [https://perma.cc/GG7A-T64L]; Chris Walker, 
There’s Been Another Chicken Pox Outbreak at Immigrant Detention Facility, WESTWORD 
(Jan. 31, 2019, 1:47 PM), https://www.westword.com/news/second-chicken-pox-outbreak-at 
-aurora-immigrant-detention-center-puts-two-pods-in-quarantine-11210867 [https://perma.cc 
/WL46-9BQ2]. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CODE RED: THE FATAL CONSEQUENCES 
OF DANGEROUSLY SUBSTANDARD MEDICAL CARE IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2018), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/us0618_immigration_web2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2KUQ-8R9P]. 
 186. RYO & PEACOCK, supra note 10, at 5. 
 187. Seville, Rappleye & Lehren, supra note 185. 
 188. See, e.g., Nina Shapiro, What Happened to Mergensana Amar? The Russian 
Immigrant’s Handwritten Note Raises Questions About Treatment at Northwest Detention 
Center, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 30, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/russian-immigrants-handwritten-note-leaves-many-questions-about-treatment-at 
-northwest-detention-center/ [https://perma.cc/X3KF-J6LB]. 
 189. See García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1383–84 (“In addition to detaining many more 
people under immigration law authority, the United States relies heavily on detention facilities 
that resemble the nation’s penal institutions. Both are secure environments in which guards 
monitor each resident’s movements. Meals, personal and legal visits, access to medical 
providers, and every other aspect of social life are regulated.”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 1387 
(“From the perspective of individuals confined in immigration detention centers, the civil or 
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conditions in for-profit immigration prisons and jails are comparable—if not 
worse—than conditions in federal and state prisons and local jails across the 
country.190 Invasive strip searches, restricted and controlled movement, round-the-
clock monitoring, overuse of solitary confinement: these are all features of criminal- 
and immigration-related incarceration, all features in government-run and for-profit 
prisons.191 Why, then, should the law not permit people in for-profit immigration 
prisons and jails to assert and vindicate their constitutional rights for past harms in 
federal court, in at least the same manner in which it permits people incarcerated in 
federal and state government-run prisons to do? 
From a constitutional values and goals perspective, there is no defensible answer 
to this question. This is so for three primary reasons: First, the theories underpinning 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Malesko and Minneci, as outlined above, fail to 
contemplate the dignity principle that underpins our nation’s constitutional norms, 
particularly with respect to confinement and incarceration. Second, the Malesko-
Minneci doctrine fails to consider the inherently governmental function of 
incarceration. And third, the doctrine neglects the constitutional goals of government 
transparency and accountability. 
                                                                                                                 
 
criminal distinction is easily lost. Detainees regularly envision themselves as confined.”) 
(footnote omitted); Lima-Marín & Jefferis, supra note 6, at 7 (“[D]eaths due to poor medical 
care and suicide in immigration confinement are on the rise. ICE has reported more than 
seventy-four deaths in immigration detention since 2010. The agency reported six deaths in 
fiscal year 2018, albeit in dubiously incomplete fashion. People refer to many immigration 
detention facilities as kennels because prisoners are held in chain-link cages and treated like 
animals by facility staff. Lights are left on in housing units constantly, making sleep difficult 
for many prisoners. In many facilities, people have no choice but to sleep on the concrete 
floor.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 190. See García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1384 (“Meanwhile, the most invasive features 
of penal imprisonment resonate through the immigration detention estate.”); Lima-Marín & 
Jefferis, supra note 6, at 8–9 (“There is little meaningful difference in the lived experiences of 
incarceration under a government’s criminal legal powers and its civil confinement. . . . In 
some situations, the immigration detention experience is even more punitive than 
incarceration.”). 
 191. See García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1384–85 (“[T]he most invasive features of 
penal imprisonment resonate through the immigration detention estate. Some individuals have 
been subjected to strip searches upon being taken into immigration custody pursuant to 
institutional policies requiring strip searches of all inmates. Most are required to wear uniforms 
color-coded to their security classification. Movements around the grounds are tightly limited 
and observed by guards; many detainees must spend ‘all or most of the day in their housing 
units,’ with as little as one hour of recreation time. Visits from family and friends are limited 
to thirty minutes a few days a week and contact is prohibited (detainees and visitors speak 
through telephones while separated by Plexiglas dividers). One facility prohibits contact visits 
even with attorneys. Others are reportedly placed in solitary confinement where they are 
locked in cells for twenty-three hours a day without contact with other detainees. A recent 
review of government data reported that several dozen were held in solitary confinement for 
more than seventy-five days, well above the fifteen days that a United Nations representative 
found to be the point at which ‘some of the harmful psychological effects of isolation can 
become irreversible.”); Lima-Marín & Jefferis, supra note 6, at 8–10 (discussing first-hand 
experience of criminal incarceration and immigration confinement). 
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Underneath each of these considerations is the premise that the disparate 
classification of people incarcerated for punishment and people confined pursuant to 
the federal government’s immigration-enforcement authority—that is, the law’s 
distinction between punitive incarceration and civil detention—may no longer be 
justifiable.192 While the nature of the legal frameworks under which the government 
imposes confinement differ, the conditions in immigration detention, and the 
experiences of the people who are incarcerated, are inherently carceral.193 And there 
are questions as to whether nonpunitive incarceration is even possible.194 While I 
reserve a full exploration of this concept for future work,195 I call this two-pronged 
faulty premise the “civil detention fallacy:”196 the current state of immigration 
detention is nothing close to civil, and the entire act of confining a person civilly may 
be impossible. Both considerations demonstrate that when it comes to conditions of 
confinement in the United States, there is no meaningful difference between criminal 
incarceration and immigration confinement. Therefore, the same values that form the 
foundation of our constitutional jurisprudence regulating criminal incarceration—
namely, dignity, the inherently governmental function of incarceration, and the need 
for transparency and accountability—must allow for a constitutional tort remedy for 
people whose rights are violated in for-profit immigration prisons.197 
A. Dignity as a Constitutional Value 
Dignity exists at the heart of the Constitution. Time and again, the Supreme Court 
has stated that constitutional protections of prisoners are girded by the concept that 
all people bear dignity, no matter their station in life:198 “By protecting even those 
convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 192. Lima-Marín & Jefferis, supra note 6, at 12–14. 
 193. Id.; see also García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1382–1388. 
 194. See Lima-Marín & Jefferis, supra note 6, at 12–13 (“With the exception of the death 
penalty, incarceration is the most extreme form of punishment that modern, democratic 
societies tolerate. Physical confinement is so inextricably intertwined with punitive authority 
that it has become, for most liberal governments, the definition of punishment.”).  
 195. Jefferis, supra note 6.  
 196. Id. 
 197. See García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1393 (“Imprisonment is unquestionably an 
awesome power that the government is authorized to wield in limited circumstances. To 
reduce the incidence of abuse by government officials, the U.S. Constitution imposes 
significant procedural obstacles to imprisonment. If immigration detention is to be 
reconceptualized as punishment, then it becomes necessary to consider the logical legal 
outcome: Imposition of punishment would be subject to the constitutional constraints on 
governmental action that apply to all criminal prosecutions.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 198. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 708 (2014) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
560 (2005)); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“The basic concept underlying the 
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”). See generally Meghan J. Ryan, 
Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the Backdrop of the Eighth Amendment, 2016 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 2129, 2141–42 (2016) (“Since 1958, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments is focused on preserving the 
dignity of man. . . . Overall, the Court has remained quite consistent in tying the Eighth 
Amendment to this concept of dignity.”). 
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government to respect the dignity of all persons.”199 “Prisoners retain the essence of 
human dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”200 The Eighth 
Amendment “embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, 
humanity, and decency . . . .”201 All of the constitutional jurisprudence derived from 
the Eighth Amendment is animated, at least in part, by this fundamental recognition: 
no matter the brutality of the crimes for which a person is convicted, he nevertheless 
is still a human being, and the government must treat him as such.  
Despite decades of reliance on the dignity principle, there has been little 
consistency in the understanding of this concept and the values animating it.202 
Professor Meghan J. Ryan traces the development of scholarly attention to 
constitutional dignity, explaining that some scholars have focused on the Kantian 
conception of dignity, which focuses on the individual.203 Others have asserted the 
Eighth Amendment’s concept of dignity focuses rather on society—a form of 
“collective . . . dignity.”204 For the scholars on this latter side of the debate, dignity 
focuses “on what society has deemed ‘civilized, decent, and virtuous.’”205 After 
engaging in an in-depth analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence on the issue, Professor 
Ryan concludes the “core of the Eighth Amendment dignity demand” is, in fact, the 
individual person.206 Under this formulation, the dignity principle is a manifestation 
of the right to self-determination—that is, the reflection of every human being’s 
autonomy and self-worth.207 The right to dignity is a “pivotal right deeply rooted in 
any notion of justice, fairness, and a society based on basic rights.”208 
Surely, the fundamental nature of dignity—recognized in all people, “even those 
convicted of heinous crimes”209—applies with at least equal force to people in 
immigration confinement. If the Court is going to regulate the constitutionality of 
penal prisons and prison conditions with dignity in mind, it must do the same for 
immigration prisons, including those prisons managed and operated by for-profit 
companies. Without a remedy to redress violations of that principle, however, 
prisoners whose rights and, accordingly, dignity were violated have no means to 
present these claims to the federal courts. And without a remedy, the right means 
very little.210 
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B. Incarceration as a Constitutional Function 
In principle, incarceration is an inherently constitutional—or public—function.211 
That is, from a moral and philosophical view, depriving a person of his liberty for 
purposes of punishment is something only a government may rightfully do.212 
Delegating that responsibility “represents the government’s abdication of one of its 
most basic responsibilities to its people.”213 Indeed, delegating this necessarily public 
function with few mechanisms in place to hold the private actors accountable 
eviscerates the oversight and accountability structure inherent to the U.S. system of 
government, with coequal branches of government imposing checks and balances on 
each other in furtherance of adhering to constitutional standards and norms. By not 
permitting prisoners to assert constitutional tort claims against private prison 
officials, the government evades responsibility for one of its core functions. 
C. Transparency and Accountability as Constitutional Goals 
Prisons are opaque institutions.214 Prisoners exist behind locked gates and barbed 
wire, on the other side of iron bars and steel doors. Journalists and lawmakers are 
often refused access; the public (excluding attorneys meeting with clients) almost 
certainly is not permitted inside most facilities to inspect the conditions or speak with 
prisoners.215 Acquiring information about the conditions inside prisons is inherently 
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 215. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 214, at 462 (“Currently, prisons and jails are 
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completely discretionary. Moreover, investigative reporting is generally in decline given the 
changing nature of media, news, and reporting. In combination with the high barriers to 
obtaining prison related information, media coverage is less able to fill the prison transparency 
gap.”); Fathi, supra note 214, at 1453 (“For obvious reasons, the public and press cannot be 
allowed the same degree of access to prisons as they are allowed to other government facilities, 
and security concerns require some monitoring and control of contacts between prisoners and 
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difficult.216 Recounting the struggles of prisoners to shine a light on their conditions 
of confinement, Professor Laura Rovner offers two quotes from prisoners that make 
this point especially poignant:  
The law does forbid the methodological use of torture. . . . [B]ut how can 
anyone prove such practices exist when only convicts witness it?217  
and  
We inmates look to the public as sheep look toward their shepherd, we’re 
crying wolf but you don’t see him. That doesn’t mean the wolf’s not 
there. He’s just wearing sheep’s clothing so you don’t see him. We can’t 
understand why you don’t see him but we see him and we smell him, and 
he stinks like death and repression.218 
The Constitution provides one key mechanism,219 however, with which to shine a 
light on prisons, expose the conditions inside the facilities, and, if necessary, impose 
change to ensure U.S. prisons adhere to constitutional norms.220 Professor Rovner 
describes the many ways in which constitutional litigation exposed conditions inside 
the federal government’s supermax prison in Florence, Colorado—the U.S. 
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Rovner, supra note 214, at 472 (“Journalists similarly have been prevented from accessing 
ADX. The Amnesty International report, citing a Westword article from 2007, noted that ‘from 
January 2002 through May 2007, officials denied every single media request for face-to-face 
interviews with ADX prisoners, or tours of the facility. . . .’ Only after mounting ‘criticism of 
lack of access’ did the BOP arrange a restricted tour of the prison in 2007 for some journalists 
with major media outlets. But, the Report noted, ‘no similar tours are believed to have been 
arranged since then.’”). 
 216. See Rovner, supra note 214, at 470–71. 
 217. Id. at 470 (alteration in original). 
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214; Mike Tartaglia, Private Prisons, Private Records, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1689, 1693 (2014) 
(“Litigation has historically been the most common and effective means of improving prison 
operations and conditions, but its effectiveness in recent years has been curtailed by statutory 
reform and judicially imposed limitations. Over the past two decades, the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (“PLRA”) drastically restricted judicial prison oversight and the ability of 
prisoners to file suit.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 220. See Borchardt, supra note 214, at 469 (“But in the 1960s and 1970s, courts began to 
look inside prison walls. They were shocked by what they saw. Courts declared some prisons 
to be ‘unfit for human habitation,’ ‘a dark and evil world completely alien to the free world,’ 
and ‘so inhumane and degrading as to amount to cruel and unusual punishment.’”) (footnotes 
omitted); Rovner, supra note 214, at 481–82.  
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Penitentiary Administrative Maximum, also known as ADX.221 After explaining how 
difficult breaking through the shroud of secrecy over ADX is for journalists, family 
members of men confined inside, and members of the public, she asserts 
constitutional litigation “is all the more necessary when the prison in question is, like 
ADX, so deeply shrouded in secrecy.”222 For centuries, unspeakable abuse of men 
and women has been allowed to happen behind prison walls because the public had 
no access, and still, the cloak of secrecy over America’s prisons in part permits the 
abuse to continue. “[L]itigation, however difficult or imperfect a tool, is a critically 
important one, not only as a mechanism for vindicating rights violations, but also 
because of its capacity to bring some of what has been kept in darkness into the 
light.”223  
As the federal government’s “most secure prison,” ADX is notoriously difficult 
to penetrate.224 For-profit immigration prisons are likewise impervious, though for 
different reasons.225 The scope of immigration detention has grown substantially in 
recent years, but information about the conditions inside the prisons is often hard to 
come by. One primary reason for this opaqueness is that unlike government-run 
prisons, open records laws do not apply to private prisons.226 Journalists, advocates, 
and others have no legal mechanism with which to demand private companies’ 
records concerning the conditions inside the facilities. Constitutional litigation, 
therefore, effectuates dual mutually reinforcing purposes: bringing claims for 
violations of constitutional rights against prison officials shines a light on the 
conditions inside prisons, and shining a light on the conditions inside prisons 
reinvigorates—and sometimes reimposes—constitutional standards on the 
facilities.227  
If the law permitted a prisoner confined in a for-profit immigration prison to bring 
a constitutional tort claim against the facility doctor who ignored his pleas for 
medical treatment, for example, the litigation would serve each of these three 
constitutional aims: Asserting a constitutional tort claim against the doctor reaffirms  
that person’s fundamental dignity—the Constitution applies to him, too. Holding the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 221. See generally Rovner, supra note 214. 
 222. Id. at 481. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 465. 
 225. See Fathi, supra note 214, at 1461–62 (“Private facilities present a special oversight 
problem. While the profit motive may increase the temptation to cut corners on staffing, 
medical care, and other essential services, private prisons are subject to even less scrutiny than 
their public counterparts.”). 
 226. Id. at 1462 (“As private corporations, they are typically not subject to open meeting 
and freedom of information laws that apply to state and local departments of corrections.”); 
Tartaglia, supra note 219, at 1691 (“In the vast majority of United States jurisdictions, private 
prisons are not required to disclose information pursuant to public records requests in the same 
manner as government prisons.”). 
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2020] CONSTITUTIONALLY UNACCOUNTABLE  181 
 
private prison’s doctor to constitutional standards reiterates that incarceration is an 
inherently governmental function and, accordingly, private companies that engage in 
the business will be held to the same standards. And much like the litigation 
concerning the conditions in ADX, the constitutional challenges to conditions inside 
for-profit immigration prisons would impose some transparency and, ultimately, 
accountability on the officials who work inside and the companies who manage and 
oversee the project. Each of these aims is crucial to ensuring prisoners across the 
United States—no matter the agency that incarcerates them nor the entity that 
operates the prison in which they are confined—are afforded equal access to the 
Constitution and the federal courts.  
CONCLUSION 
Justice Stevens predicted dire circumstances for federal prisoners in private 
prisons when he dissented from the majority’s opinion in Malesko: “Indeed, a tragic 
consequence of today’s decision is the clear incentive it gives to corporate managers 
of privately operated custodial institutions to adopt cost-saving policies that 
jeopardize the constitutional rights of the tens of thousands of inmates in their 
custody.”228 The Court’s decisions in Malesko and Minneci disallowing prisoners a 
constitutional tort remedy against private prisons and their employees have created 
a differentiated system of constitutional accountability among America’s prisons. 
Prisoners in government-run prisons may bring tort claims against the prison officials 
who violate their constitutional rights; prisoners in for-profit federal prisons may not 
bring the same claims against the prison officials who violate those same rights. 
Indeed, the consequences of these decisions are “incongruous and confusing,” as 
Justice Stevens predicted.229 
No group of prisoners feels this on a larger scale than those people confined in 
for-profit immigration prisons. The daily population of people in immigration 
confinement is growing each year, and a large majority of those people will at one 
time during their confinement be in a private prison. Should their constitutional rights 
be violated in those spaces—as they were for Roberto, who pleaded for more than a 
year for medical treatment for the painful symptoms of his gunshot injuries—they 
will have no remedy to hold the responsible people accountable. Indeed, the spaces 
are constitutionally unaccountable.  
The punitive nature of modern immigration confinement—premised on the civil 
detention fallacy—renders this incongruence among people in federal for-profit 
immigration prisons and those in government-run prisons unjustifiable. The inability 
of people in for-profit immigration confinement to hold their jailers constitutionally 
accountable undermines the constitutional value of dignity, permits the abdication of 
the constitutional function of incarceration, and impedes the constitutional goals of 
transparency and accountability. In future work, I will show how for-profit 
immigration prisons should be “constitutionalized” through a reframing of the 
current debate regarding immigration confinement and the for-profit prison industry 
to achieve incremental doctrinal shifts geared toward dismantling the public-private 
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prison divide. The Constitution, and its promise of dignity for all, demands nothing 
less.  
